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Abstract
In this paper I readdress the result that capital income taxes are bad
instruments for pure redistribution and should be zero in the long run.
In a neoclassical growth model a capital income cum investment subsidy
tax, which is not distorting accumulation, is considered to investigate if
net capital income taxes used for pure redistribution are zero in a long-run
optimum. I find that capital income taxes may be nonzero, depending
on the political power of those who receive redistributive transfers, the
distribution of pre-tax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
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1 Introduction
In influential papers Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) have shown that capital
income taxes are no good instruments for pure redistribution in a neoclassical
growth framework. Their finding ist that optimally capital income taxes should
be zero in the long run.1
The intuition for the result is intriguing. Even workers who may not own
capital and may, therefore, not accumulate resources might benefit more from
higher steady state wages resulting from nondistorted accumulation with zero
taxes than having redistributive transfers now at the expense of a lower steady
state capital stock and so wages in the long run.
The authors then contemplated other capital income policy packages, includ-
ing consumption taxes, and basically found the same result as in, for instance,
Judd (1999). However, that capital income taxers are not good instruments for
redistribution need not always hold, as was shown by Lansing (1999). He found
a counterexample for a world where agents have logarithmic utility.
Also, in an endogenous growth framework with productive government expen-
diture financed by a capital income tax, Rehme (1995) shows that zero capital
income tax rates are not optimal. That the optimal capital income tax rate
may be nonzero in growth contexts has, for instance, been shown by Uhlig and
Yanagawa (1996) and others.
In this paper I relate to these finding in a simple neoclassical growth frame-
work. Coupling capital income taxes with investment subsidies to finance pure
redistributive transfers to the non-accumulated factor or production (”workers”)
may also imply a nondistortionary policy package, similar to a consumption tax
on ”capitalists”. That governments redistribute resources but also subsidize in-
1Similar results have been obtained by many authors as, for example, Lucas (1990).
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vestment from collected tax revenues appears to be a pervasive phenomenon in
most countries. Hence, these realistic features may justify the policy package
under consideration.
When taking governments - no matter which clientele a benevolent govern-
ment represents - to pursue such a nondistortionary policy that seems to benefit
everybody, it turns out that capital income taxes may not always be optimally
zero in the long run. Rather, I find that capital income taxes may optimally be
nonzero for redistribution. This depends on very intuitive conditions. As one
might expect from actual taxation by governments the optimal choice of capital
income taxes in the long run depends on the political power of those who receive
redistributive transfers, the distribution of pre-tax income among individuals,
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Complementing the counterexample of Lansing (1999), which is based on
logarithmic utility functions, this paper’s results may qualify the generality of the
zero-capital-income result in other important and possibly quite realistic ways.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the optimality for tax rates in long-run equilibrium. Section 4 provides
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a government, identical competitive firms and two types
of infinitely-lived, equally patient and price taking individuals called workers and
capitalists. All agents derive utility form the consumption of a homogenous, mal-
leable good. The population is normalized so that the number of each type equals
one. The model abstracts from uncertainty, technological progress, population
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growth and depreciation. The latter implies that aggregates are really defined in
net terms which has no consequence for the price-taking, market clearing logic
of the model. The workers supply one unit of unskilled labour inelastically and
do not save or invest.2 Thus, all the wealth is concentrated in the hands of the
capitalists who do not work.
2.1 Capitalists
At each period the capital owners choose how much of their income to consume
or invest, and they take prices and policy as given. Their instantaneous budget
constraint is given by
ct + it = (1− θt)rtkt + ptit and it = k˙t.
Thus, the capitalists derive income from renting their capital3, kt, to com-
petitive firms at the rate rt. Gross rental income is taxed at the rate θt and a
fraction pt of investment undertaken, it, is subsidized by the government. Thus,
investment subsidies are ptit. The capitalists’ consumption ct depends on their
after-tax capital income minus after-tax investment.4
2The assumption may be rationalized by imposing transaction costs on the workers when
borrowing small amounts. Thus, the model uses the commonly used framework of Kaldor
(1956) and Pasinetti (1962), which is also employed by Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999).
3Capital may also be taken to be broadly defined to include human capital. See Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992).
4As ct = (1 − θt)rtkt − k˙t + ptk˙t, the term ptk˙t may be interpreted as a form of politically
determined capital depreciation allowance which is directly and positively related to the amount
invested.
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Rearranging the capital owners solve
max
ckt
∫ ∞
0
u[ct] e
−ρtdt
s.t. k˙t =
(
1−θt
1−pt
)
rtkt − ct1−pt (1)
k(0) = given, k(∞) = free. (2)
where ρ is the constant rate of time preference, common to all agents. The
instantaneous utility function u[ct] satisfies the usual properties u
′ ≥ 0, u′′ ≤ 0
and lim
ct→∞
u′ = 0 and lim
ct→0
u′ = ∞ where u′ = du[ct]
dct
and u′′ = d
2u[ct]
dc2t
. The current
value Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = u[ct] + λt
((
1− θt
1− pt
)
rtkt − ct
1− pt
)
and the necessary first order conditions for its maximization are
Hc : u
′ − λt
1−θt = 0 (3a)
Hk : −λt
(
1−θt
1−pt
)
rt + ρλt = λ˙t (3b)
plus the transversality condition lim
t→∞
ktλte
−ρtdt = 0 and the requirement that
equation (1) holds.5 The co-state variable λt represents the capital owners’
shadow price of an additional unit of capital in terms of utility.
2.2 Workers
The (unskilled) workers do not invest and are not taxed by assumption.6 They
supply one unit of labour inelastically at each date and derive utility from con-
5As H is concave in ct and kt, the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
6The working population is normalized so that there is one worker and one capitalist.
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suming their entire wage and transfer income. Their total income xt depends on
wage income and lump-sum transfers granted by the government,
xt = wt + TRt. (4)
Their intertemporal utility is given by
∫ ∞
0
v[xt] e
−ρtdt where v[xt] need not be
the same as that of the capitalists, but it is also assumed to satisfy v′ ≥ 0, v′′ ≤ 0
and the conditions lim
xt→∞
v′ = 0 and lim
xt→0
v′ =∞ where v′ = dv[xt]
dxt
and v′′ = d
2v[xt]
dx2t
.
2.3 Firms
The firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment and maximize profits.
The capital owners rent capital to and demand shares of the firms, which are
collateralized one-to-one by capital. The markets for assets, capital and labour
clear at each point in time so that the firms face a path of uniform, market
clearing rental rates for capital and labour. Given perfect competition the firms
rent capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period. The price of output
serves as nume´raire and is set equal to 1 at each date, implying that the price of
capital, kt, in terms of overall consumption stays at unity.
Aggregate production is constant returns to scale in capital and labour inputs.
Since the labour input equals one, kt can also be interpreted as the capital labour-
ratio. The production function f(kt) for the representative firm is assumed to
be increasing and strictly concave in kt with lim
t→∞
f ′(kt) = 0 and lim
t→0
f ′(kt) = ∞.
Profit maximization implies
rt = f
′(kt) (5)
wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt (6)
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and perfect competition and the free entry and exit of firms means that profits,
f(kt)− rtkt − wt, are zero.
2.4 Government
Following Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999), I rule out a market for government
bonds and assume that the government can commit itself to following a tax-
transfer policy announced at t = 0. The government chooses paths of θt, pt and
TRt to maximize a weighted sum of the agents’ lifetime utilities, subject to the
optimal behaviour of the private sector in an equilibrium and the condition that
its budget be balanced at each point in time
TRt = θtrtkt − ptk˙t.
Thus, the government collects capital income taxes to grant an investment subsidy
(ptk˙t) to the capital owners and use the remaining resources for lump-sum trans-
fers to the workers. Hence, we contemplate a capital-income-cum-investment-
subsidy-tax (CICIST) scheme.
2.4.1 Non-Distortion of Accumulation
One important consequence of the result that capital income taxes be optimally
zero is that the capital accumulation process will not be disturbed by political
interference. Therefore, I assume that the government, no matter what clientele
is represents, wishes to minimize its distortionary impact on accumulation.
The impact of accumulation distortion can be inferred from the Euler equation
in (3b). It shows how agents evaluate the evolution of the state variable kt
in terms of their welfare. This then leads them to a particular accumulation
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programme. Policy would in general distort this evaluation which is captured by
the term 1−θt
1−pt .
The government does not distort this evaluation in a long-run equilibrium with
λ˙ = 0 in (3b) when θt = 0, pt = 0,∀t. This is basically what the result in Judd
(1985) implies. But another nondistortionary policy is possible, namely when
θt = pt. This is the one we contemplate from now on. Whether nondistortionry
θt = pt implies zero tax rates will be the focus of the analysis below.
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The nondistortion assumption θt = pt has the following implications: When
the factor input and goods markets are in equilibrium the workers’ income is
given by8
x = w + TR = f(k)− rk + θrk − θk˙ (7)
In equilibrium the overall resource constraint is such that the agents satisfy their
budget constraints. Substitution of (1) into (7) one then obtains
x = f(k)− rk + θc
1− θ (8)
Thus, the equilibrium income of the workers is increasing in the consumption
of the capital owners and in θ, because that raises tax revenues that can be
transferred to the workers raising their total income.
7This assumption nests a setup with just θ and no pt and perhaps finding that the optimal
θt is then zero in the long run. Notice that this policy package is tantamount to a tax on
the capitalists’ consumption. However, it is implemented as an income tax scheme and, thus,
different.
8From now on time subscripts are dropped for convenience whenever it is clear that a
particular variable depends on time.
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3 The Long-Run Optimal Capital Income Tax
A benevolent government respects the private sector optimality conditions, keeps
the agents on their respective supply and demand curves, and chooses a policy
that can be realized as a competitive equilibrium.9 The government minimizes
distortions for accumulation by setting θt = pt and solves
max
k,c,θ,λ
∫ ∞
0
[
γ v[f(k)− rk + θc
1−θ ] + u[c]
]
e−ρtdt s.t.
u′(c)− λ
1−θ = 0 (9a)
−λr + ρλ = λ˙ (9b)
rk − c
1−θ = k˙ (9c)
θ ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞
λke−ρt = 0 (9d)
where γ ∈ (0,∞) represents the social weight attached to the welfare of the work-
ers. If γ → 0, the government is only concerned about the capitalists, whereas it
only cares about the workers when γ → ∞. The current value Hamiltonian for
this problem is given by
Hg = γv[·] + u[c] + µ1(u′ − λ1−θ ) + q1λ(−r + ρ) + q2(r k − c1−θ )
where q1 is the social marginal value of the private marginal value λ which mea-
sures how valuable more capital is in terms of utility. Furthermore, q2 is the
9Similar setups are used by Judd (1985), Judd (1999), and Lansing (1999).
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social marginal value of more capital k. The necessary first order conditions are
Hgk : γ v
′[·](f ′ − r) + q2r = ρq2 − q˙2 (10a)
Hgc : γ v
′[·] θ
1−θ + u
′[·] + µ1u′′[·]− q2 11−θ = 0 (10b)
Hgθ : θ
(
γv′[·] c
(1−θ)2 − q2 c(1−θ)2 − µ1 λ(1−θ)2
)
= 0 (10c)
Hgλ : − µ11−θ + q1(−r + ρ) = ρq1 − q˙1 (10d)
where (10c) has to hold with complementary slackness due to the requirement
that θ cannot be negative.10 Furthermore, the equations (9a), (9b) and (9c) and
the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
q1λe
−ρt = 0 and lim
t→∞
q2ke
−ρt = 0 have to hold.
The analysis is restricted to the long-run when the economy is at a steady
state, balanced growth position with k˙ = λ˙ = c˙ = q˙1 = q˙2 = 0.
Suppose the government attaches some positive weight on the workers’ wel-
fare, γ > 0. Then (10a) holds if f ′ = r = ρ. This pins down the capital stock to
k˜ in steady state.11 Equation (9c) implies c = (1−θ)ρk˜ in steady state and (10d)
is only satisfied when q1 = µ1 = 0.
12 Then q2 = γ v
′[·] by (10c) for an interior
equilibrium and substitution of this into (10b) establishes that γv′ = u′ must
hold. As the capital stock is fixed at k˜, which depends on ρ, and as c = (1− θ)k˜,
the latter condition boils down to finding θ such that
γ v′[f(k˜)− ρk˜ + θρk˜] = u′[(1− θ)ρk˜]. (11)
10One might argue that negative θ is a form of wage tax and should not be ruled out a priori.
However, as can be verified from (10c) negative θ is only possible in the model when γ = 0 and
the government would not really be that benevolent anymore.
11Thus, as t→∞ the capital stock kt approaches some time invariant constant k˜. From now
on the tilde will denote variables in long-run steady state equilibrium.
12Lansing (1999) uses logarithmic utility for his counterexample to the zero capital income
taxation result in Judd (1985). Notice here that if θ = 0 then c = ρk which would correspond
to the optimal consumption rule of agents with logarithmic utility. However, in this paper the
result is obtained by imposing optimality conditions in a steady state and for a very general
class of utility functions.
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Clearly as γ → ∞ and the government is entirely pro-labour, the LHS becomes
infinite and as a consequence θ = 1 would be optimal, since lim
ct→0
u′[·] =∞.13
Lemma 1 If the workers and the capitalists have different utility functions and
the government represents the workers only, then the optimal capital income tax
under a capital-income-cum-investment-subsidy-tax (CICIST) scheme is nonzero
in the long run and redistribution from capital to labour is maximal.
Notice that this result does not depend on production externalities or any
other things, the capital income taxes may be used for, except for using part of
the revenue for investment subsidies.
Of course, the government does not always place so much weight on the work-
ers. In fact, by implicit differentiation one verifies that the optimal tax rate,
if it exists, is increasing in γ. Thus, as the workers get more political power
they would choose higher capital income taxes under the capital-income-cum-
investment-subsidy-tax (CICIST) scheme.14
It is not entirely clear why workers should evaluate a consumption good any
differently than a capital owner. For that reason it is now assumed that v[x] = u[c]
for any x = c so that the two groups have the same utility function. As I am
only interested in conditions under which the capital income tax is zero in the
long-run let us assume that the utility functions are of the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) type: u[c] = c
1−β−1
1−β and v[x] =
x1−β−1
1−β . Then (11) would be
13Rehme (1995) and Rehme (2002) obtain a similar result in an endogenous growth framework
where redistribution occurs via productive government input financed by a capital income tax
cum investment subsidy scheme.
14Notice that k˜ would be the same under any other capital income tax scheme for which
it is shown that the long-run capital income tax should be zero. This is an important point,
because overall welfare (sum of utilities) may be higher under CICIST in comparison to those
other capital income tax schemes.
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given by
γ
(
f(k˜)− (1− θ)ρk˜
)−β
=
(
(1− θ)ρk˜
)−β
f(k˜)
(1− θ)ρk˜ = γ
1
β + 1.
As r = ρ = f ′ the fraction ρk˜
f(k˜)
≡ α corresponds to the capital share in
production. Hence, the optimal θ is determined by
θ˜ =
α(γ
1
β + 1)− 1
α(γ
1
β + 1)
(12)
and is increasing in the share of capital so that distribution matters. Furthermore,
the optimal long-run capital income tax rate is positive as long as
γ >
(
1− α
α
)β
. (13)
In the macroeconomics literature it is common to argue that α is less than one
half.15 Furthermore, there is evidence that β, that is, the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of consumption between different dates is quite
large. That would imply that one would need a sufficiently large γ to obtain the
result that θ˜ is positive in the long run.
However, if 0 ≤ γ < (1−α
α
)β
, then θ˜ = 0 would follow. This is so because θ˜ = 0
implies u′ = q2 = λ by (10b) and (9a). Thus, as long as k˜ satisfies r = f ′ = ρ
and as long as γ <
(
1−α
α
)β
we have γv′ < u′ so that indeed θ˜ = 0 is optimal in
15The capital share is less than one half in standard neoclassical growth models. If one
assumes that capital is broadly defined as in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), then the share
of capital is usually bigger than one half. In that case the condition on γ would be less
demanding. Thus, if α > 12 , then less political weight going to the workers would be needed
to obtain the result that the capital income tax rate is nonzero in the optimum. However, in
what follows I will implicitly concentrate on the more conventional case of a capital share that
is less than one half.
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those circumstances.
But then the result that zero capital income taxes are optimal in the long run
depends on 1. the social weight attached to the workers, 2. the income share of
capital in production and 3. the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Proposition 1 Let the agents possess the same constant relative risk aversion
utility functions. Under a capital-income-cum-investment-subsidy-tax (CICIST)
scheme the optimal capital income tax rate θ˜ is non-zero if the social planner
attaches sufficient weight on the welfare of the workers γ >
(
1−α
α
)β
. In contrast, if
γ <
(
1−α
α
)β
, then θ˜ = 0 is optimal. Hence, under CICIST the income distribution,
preferences and the political weight of the workers determine whether the optimal
capital income taxes are zero in the long run.
Thus, under the (nondistorting) capital income tax scheme under considera-
tion (CICIST) distributional and preference parameters matter and that may pro-
vide another counterexample to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). Importantly,
the proposition establishes that there may be instances when capital income taxes
are optimally non-zero in the long run. For the result here one does not need an
explicit decision rule of the private sector to obtain the result. Lansing (1999)
bases his counterexample on the fact that solving for the optimal private sector
decision rule first may subsequently pin down the choice of consumption for a
benevolent social planner. Capital income taxes may then be non-zero when the
special case of logarithmic utility is considered. But here the non-zero tax result
may hold even though the agents have very different utility functions or all utility
functions are of the general CRRS type which includes the logarithmic one as a
special case. Thus, even though the social planner only concentrates on the first
order conditions of the private sector and does not explicitly know the agents’
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final decision rules, and even though he has freedom to choose consumption and
capital independently, capital income taxes may optimally be non-zero in the
long-run.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I readdress the result that capital income taxes are bad instruments
for pure redistribution and should be zero in the long run.
Coupling capital income taxes with investment subsidies for financing pure re-
distribution may imply nonzero capital income taxes. I consider a policy package
that is nondistortionary for accumulation and find that whether or not capital
income taxes are optimally zero in the long run depends on probably quite real-
istic conditions for taxation policy. The most important conditions identified in
this paper are: (a) the political power of those who receive redistributive trans-
fers, (b) the distribution and so inequality in pre-tax factor incomes, and (c) the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
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